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Analyzing Legal Formality and Informality:
Lessons From Land-Titling And
Microfinance Programs1
Antara Haldar and Joseph E. Stiglitz
INTRODUCTION
Despite the fact that China has experienced incredible growth, there is a great deal
of pressure on it to adopt a more formal legal framework—particularly with
respect to economic matters. Chicago School law and economics—emphasizing
the importance of formal law for development, particularly for protecting private
property and the enforcing of contracts—has been influential in this discourse.2
This book has argued, however, that Chicago-style law and economics makes
assumptions about the economy, as well as what the law is and how it functions,
that are far from trivial and mostly untrue. Kennedy and Stiglitz in their intro-
duction to this volume, as well as Chapters 1, 4, and 5, highlight some of these
limitations and analyze their implications.
Here, we focus on one particular aspect of this legal tradition: the Chicago
School underestimates the difficulty of fully articulating a set of rules, as well as the
role that social norms play in the legal process. As we will show, property rights
are fundamentally affected by norms of use, and contracts are never complete.
The primacy traditionally accorded to formal law is called into question by a
twin set of factors in recent development experience. The first is the failure of
formal law in large swathes of the developing world to effectively reach the
majority of its people. Indeed, according to a recent report by the Commission
for the Legal Empowerment of the Poor, four billion people are “excluded from
the rule of law.”3 India, a proverbial “bottomless pit” of rights—with an elaborate
written constitution, a wide array of legislative protections, and a sophisticated
court apparatus, but a failure to provide effective access to rights—is a case in
point.4 The second is the unexpected success of unconventional institutional
structures. The paradigmatic example of this is China itself—the greatest devel-
opment success of recent times, achieving its unprecedented growth rates in the
absence of clearly assigned private property rights in the Western sense.5
The failure of formal law to reach so many in developing countries does not, of
course, mean that if we could better reach them, performance (especially as
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measured by the well-being of the poor) might not be better. Nor does the fact that
China has succeeded so well in the past mean that more formal structures will not
be necessary in the future. Every country has some institutional design for
allocating resources, adjudicating disputes, etc.—designs that are always evolving.
China’s will too, and almost surely rapidly as it moves into the next stages of its
transition to a market economy. As it does, it will be important for it not to fall
prey to certain shibboleths, simplistic notions about what legal structures should
or must look like for a modern economy.
This chapter looks at recent attempts to extend credit to poor people around
the world. Since most legal systems contain elements of both the formal and the
informal, the distinction between formal and informal law is largely a false
dichotomy. However, in transitioning to developed markets countries do encoun-
ter important choices with regard to their strategy for institutional reform.6
Indeed, although the Chicago School would argue that rapid legal formalization
is imperative, there are two very different institutional experiments underway for
making this transition—one emphasizing legal formalization, in keeping with the
orthodoxy, and the other taking an altogether different, more norm-based ap-
proach. The first approach is exemplified by the Hernando de Soto-inspired land
titling program in Peru, and the second is illustrated by the trust-based micro-
finance program of Muhammad Yunus’s Grameen Bank.7 (We refer to Yunus and
the Grameen Bank, but we should emphasize that there are other, roughly
contemporaneous, microfinance schemes, most notably Bangladesh Rural Ad-
vancement Committee (BRAC), headed by Fazle Hasan Abed, which have met
with equal success.) We use the Peruvian and Bangladeshi programs as models of
alternative trajectories of institutional evolution. Our purpose is to contrast these
two experiments to bring the lessons that we learn from them to bear on the
critical institutional choices facing China and to underscore the existence of
alternatives to the monochromatic focus of the Chicago School on formal law to
the exclusion of all else.
The basis for comparing the Peruvian and Bangladeshi programs may not
appear immediately obvious, but a closer examination reveals uncanny similar-
ities between them. Indeed, Yunus and de Soto concur almost entirely in substan-
tive terms: both emphasize the skills of entrepreneurship often displayed within
poor communities, the importance of poor people lifting themselves out of
poverty rather than becoming dependent on charity, the culpability of institu-
tional mechanisms in maintaining poverty, and, most critically, the importance of
access to credit for poor people as a means of alleviating poverty.8 The crucial
difference between them, however, lies in their institutional innovations—their
choice of mechanism for credit delivery. De Soto prescribes the assignment of
formal legal title of land to the names of those who already informally occupy it,9
to enable them to use the land as collateral to access credit through the formal
banking system. Yunus, on the other hand, provides credit to the poor without
collateral, mediated only by trust-based peer-monitoring networks whereby bor-
rowers are organized into groups in which the ability of group members to borrow
depends on other members repaying. After members are established, however,
loans are increasingly issued on an individual basis, relying largely on the bor-
rower’s desire to maintain a good reputation with the lender.10 Although neither is
explicitly a legal reform program, if these two schemes are seen in the light of their
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common goal—to enable poor people to access credit as a means of alleviating
poverty—they allow us to conduct a systematic comparison of the regulatory
mechanisms that underlie them: one based on formal legal intervention and the
other on informal regulation.
This comparison proves extremely significant for a number of reasons. First,
the fact that the two schemes pick such dramatically different mechanisms, one
substantially informal and the other substantially formal, for achieving the same
goal—access to credit—allows us to compare the performance of the two mech-
anisms against a common benchmark. We realize, of course, that the distinction
between formal and informal is far from absolute. While the relationship between
the bank and borrower is informal within the Yunus model, the relationship
between the bank and state is mediated by formal law—the Grameen Bank
Ordinance of 1983.11 On the other hand, the claim that the de Soto model
wants to formalize (i.e., the rights of squatters through de facto occupation) is
essentially an informal one. In addition, de Soto calls for incorporating elements
of the “extra-legal” into the formal legal code, i.e., he advocates introducing
elements of prudential informal business and other practices into the formal
legal code through close observation of on-the-ground, informal norms, thereby
creating a bridge between the formal law and the informal practice.12 Nonetheless,
the thrust of the two programs is different enough to provide stylized representa-
tions of the opposing directions in which legal reform programs can go: a rapid
move from informality to legal formality or a gradual building of a code of informal
norms that may subsequently be formalized. The real-world implementation of the
models—primarily in the form of the Grameen Bank13 in Bangladesh and the 1996
titling program in Peru14—provides empirical evidence on the performance of the
schemes. Both programs have had tremendous international influence. De Soto’s
Lima-based think tank, the Institute for Liberty and Democracy (ILD), has not only
advised the Peruvian government’s titling program,15 it is also advising govern-
ments around the world on how to replicate it.16 In addition, international organ-
izations like theWorld Bank17 and the United Nations (especially through the work
of the Commission for the Legal Empowerment of the Poor)18 have taken on board
de Soto’s recommendations. The Grameen Bank, on the other hand, has directly
supported the establishment of replicas in thirty-four countries (to say nothing of
the hundreds of microfinance organizations that it has inspired all over the world),
and has had at least equal influence on international development agencies.19 The
United Nations, in particular, has focused much attention on microfinance, par-
ticularly in the context of achieving the Millennium Development Goals, declaring
2005 as the Year of Microcredit.20 At the same time, the World Bank is the largest
investor in microfinance worldwide.21
Not surprisingly, given the prominence that the two schemes have attained—
and the claims that their advocates have made about their potential to alleviate
poverty—this comparison is of enormous academic and policy significance in
facilitating the formulation of successful legal reform strategies. Indeed, it is
somewhat surprising that despite the amount of academic and policy attention
that these programs have attracted and their obvious commonalities, they have
been operating in parallel without any systematic attempt being made to explore
the equally obvious tensions between them. If we agree that access to credit is an
important policy goal, what is the superior way of achieving this—through formal
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law or informal norms? More broadly, does this comparison tell us anything about
the better way of achieving developmental goals and, more generally, other societal
objectives?
Although this chapter is essentially theoretical, we use illustrative evidence from
the Grameen Bank and the Peruvian titling program based on insights gathered
over twenty years spent observing the programs and extensive interviews in the
field, as well as the now vast empirical literature.22 Additional evidence is pre-
sented from program replicas in various parts of the world in order to establish a
broader generality to the results.23 We emphasize, however, that context is of the
essence: the choice of the regulatory intervention likely to work in a given context
is bound to depend on a country’s circumstances, such as the type of social capital
more readily available and the development of certain market institutions.24 It is
impossible to conclude that one intervention is superior to the other per se, but
rather, that a particular intervention works better given a particular set of circum-
stances. It may be that a program that is appropriate at one stage of development
may cease to be so at another. We return to this point later.
We will focus on four central questions. First, how does the de Soto scheme
perform? In particular, as the most recent vintage of high-profile formal law
reform projects, does it overcome the chronic problems faced by its predeces-
sors—legal transplants that fail to “take root” in the developing world? Second,
how does the more informal, community-based Grameen model perform, espe-
cially in relative terms? Third, how do these two models relate to the Chinese
experience? Fourth, how can the relationship between law and norms be charac-
terized, and what insights do these two experiments have for our understanding of
this relationship? To what extent should we view formal law and informal norms
as substitutes or complements?
The central task of the chapter will be to draw insights from the comparison of
formal and informal means to achieve a common developmental goal—in this
case, access to credit—for systems of regulation in general. The chapter is divided
into four parts. The first frames the discussion, while the following section
compares the two alternative models of institutional evolution—the Yunus and
de Soto programs—in terms of their efficiency and equity impacts and analyzes
them in static and dynamic terms. The third section examines how the two models
relate to the Chinese experience and the fourth section concludes.
TWO MODELS OF INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION
We view the provision of credit as a contract—implicit or explicit—between the
lender and a borrower. The lender provides money today; the borrower promises
to repay the money at a fixed date in the future, with interest. When the borrower
doesn’t comply, there are certain consequences. The adverse consequences pro-
vide (part of) the motivation for the borrower to repay the loan. The enforcement
provisions are central; if there were no way of enforcing a contract (no incentive
for the borrower to repay) credit markets could not exist—the lender, knowing
that he would not be repaid, would never part with his money. Contracts (implicit
or explicit) are never simple. Extreme punishments (such as the death penalty)
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provide strong incentives for repayment; if individuals could always comply, that
would be the end of the story. But events happen that make it essentially impos-
sible for the borrower to fulfill his commitments. If the borrower knew that there
would be extreme penalties, regardless of his ability to repay, that too could
destroy the loan market. Thus, a well-designed credit contract has some flexibility.
In practice, banks will roll over loans, and in some cases, even engage in debt
forgiveness. Extreme measures (like debtor prisons) may provide strong incen-
tives, but more flexible contracts may actually be more successful in getting
repayment in adverse situations, and the knowledge of such flexibility may
facilitate more borrowing.
In a formal contract, the consequences of nonrepayment are set forth; but the
enforcement even of formal contracts is governed by norms, e.g., concerning
rollovers.
The elements of the property rights approach to extending credit (which, for
brevity, we will call the de Soto model) are simple: Property (land) registration
enables individuals to put up collateral to obtain credit; the provision of credit
overcomes the fundamental problem of contract enforcement—if a borrower does
not repay the loan, he loses his collateral. De Soto postulates that the reason that
commercial banks have been reluctant to enter into loan contracts with poor
people is the lender’s fear of nonrepayment; the ability of poor individuals to
provide collateral in the form of land overcomes this problem. Responsibility for
enforcing the contract is vested in a third party—the state legal system; the state
turns over the collateral to the lender in the event of default.25
“Good” contracts have to be well-designed and effectively enforced. Well-
designed contracts share risks, provide incentives for repayment, and have sufficient
clarity that they do not raise problems of enforcement. Central to the success of a
credit market is its ability to “solve” the critical problems of selection (who is
creditworthy), monitoring (ensuring that the funds are used in the way intended),
and enforcement (ensuring loan recovery). The lower the information costs of
overcoming each of these problems in the two models, the more efficient it is
(Hoff and Stiglitz 1990). Design and enforcement are related: lenders are unlikely to
enter into a contract unless they consider the promise of enforcement credible.26
The two models (Grameen and de Soto) differ in how and how well they solve
these problems. From a legal perspective, what is critical are the differences in
their modes of enforcement. Some credit contracts that might be enforced under
some circumstances in one “model” may not be in the other and vice versa.
Differences in enforcement effectiveness affect not only the overall level of lending
activity, but also who has access to credit.
Dasgupta (2003) has identified four systems of contract enforcement. The first,
“mutual affection,” is based on group members caring about each other. The
second is “pro-social disposition,” based on norms of reciprocity, such as might
arise out of evolutionary development and socialization. The third is “mutual
enforcement” based on fear of social sanction in the context of long-term, settled
relationships in a community where people encounter each other repeatedly in the
same situation. These three enforcement mechanisms are central to “informal”
legal systems.
The fourth, “external enforcement,” relies on an established third-party
authority—that is typically, but need not be, the state—to enforce explicit
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contracts. This is the model represented by formal, Western-style legal systems. The
effectiveness of such an enforcement system may rely on a sufficient number of
individuals opting in to the system of authority (i.e., a social norm to comply with
authority, enforced in turn, perhaps, by a system of sanctions for noncompliance);
or it may rely on coercive force, e.g., through state power. However, enforcement
achieved largely through coercion, even if feasible, is typically highly uneconom-
ical.27 Thus, interestingly, the line between formal and informal systems is blurred
by the fact that the most effective formal system is one that is sustained by the norm
of compliance with it.
Although there are obvious gains to be reaped from cooperation, it can often
be contrary to individual interest, especially when that interest is shortsighted.
That is, cooperation may not be able to be sustained as an equilibrium.28 Further,
Hoff and Stiglitz (2008) show that dysfunctional institutions may persist, and a
constituency for the rule of law may fail to be established, despite its being in
everyone’s interests in the long run.29 Thus, a successful institutional structure will
have to set the incentives right to be able to balance the trade-off between short-
term costs and long-term gains to achieve compliance and coordination. Key to
this calculus appears to be the beliefs of agents within the system—beliefs that are
themselves affected by the system itself.
Efficiency
We begin by comparing the relative performance of the two models in terms of
efficiency. The alternative models will be evaluated in terms of their success in
providing credit to low-income individuals who otherwise would not have access
to credit. There is, fortunately, an abundance of data on which to base judgments
regarding their success.
Although approximately 3.5 million Peruvian households received title under
the de Soto scheme,30 it appears to have largely failed to lead to the postulated
increase in access to credit—particularly from the private sector (Field and Torero
2004).31 Calderon (2004) provides further evidence of the lack of a link between
titling and private-sector lending in Peru: he estimates that by 2002 only about
1 percent of titled families had obtained mortgages or mortgage loans (ibid.: 299).
Similarly, Galliani and Schargrodsky (2005) find that effects of titling on access to
credit are extremely modest in Argentina.32 In the case of Colombia, Gilbert
(2002: 14) finds that “possession of legal title makes little or no difference to the
availability of formal finance.”
In stark contrast, not only has Grameen entered into informal lending contracts
with more than nine million poor borrowers,33 but the peer-monitoring mechan-
ism has proven to be an extremely effective means of enforcing contracts, with a
repayment rate of 98 percent (Grameen Bank; Hossain 1988). Similarly, a study by
Sharma and Zeller (1997) finds comparable repayment rates for several other
microfinance organizations in the subcontinent.34 Counter to the theoretical faith
vested in formal legal systems, the relative success of the informal Grameen
mechanism in inducing entry into mutually beneficial contracts and ensuring
that the contracts are honored is unambiguous.35
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The de Soto model
How do we understand the seeming failure of the de Soto model? First, de Soto’s
assumption that the problem of access to credit is based on the absence of
collateral may be flawed. Indeed, in the developed world, most loans are based
on future cash flows rather than collateral. Second, even if collateral were a
material consideration, the scheme assumes the existence of a complete set of
land markets robust enough to support the use of land as collateral, despite much
evidence of their absence in most parts of the developing world (Platteau 2000;
Gilbert 2002). A partial explanation may be that owners consider their land as
family assets rather than as capital (Finmark Trust 2004; Tomlinson 2005).36 In
some places, there may be another reason for the failure of land markets to
develop: in several communities in the developing world, land has an ontological
meaning as something almost sacred, rather than a saleable asset. Furthermore,
good risk markets are absent in many developing countries. Land ownership
provides what limited security they can obtain. Third, because of high legal
costs (of enforcing the debt contract and obtaining the collateral), the value of
the collateral to the bank is low—much lower than the value of the land itself.
Hence, the attractiveness of the collateral to the bank is limited (Arrunada 2003).
Finally, Gilbert (2002) argues that titled families may themselves be reluctant to
take loans—being intimidated by bank requirements or fearing default—and,
consequently, preferring informal sources of credit instead.
Nor does titling ensure that enforcement is credible.37 There are two problems:
the information requirements for effective enforcement and legal capacity. The
external enforcement model—or formal law—requires that breaches be both
observable and publicly verifiable. Thus, the information costs associated with it
are high, particularly in the context of the information asymmetries of the develop-
ing world—making its prospects of success exceedingly weak (Stiglitz 1990; Hoff
and Stiglitz 1990). At one level this appears trivial: breaches can be observed easily
enough—it simply means that the borrower has not repaid. But within the formal
system, observing the breach does not, by itself, justify punitive action. The system
entails the further requirement of public verifiability established through the “due
process” of the formal legal system—typically a complex and long procedure even
when the breach itself is plainly obvious. Further, the formal system views breaches
in a binary manner—displaying little sensitivity (especially compared with informal
systems) to qualitative factors like the legitimacy (or lack thereof) of the reasons for
the breach.
We noted earlier that the efficacy of a formal legal system is ultimately
determined by enough agents opting in to it. This is, in turn, determined by the
dual factors of confidence in the enforcement agency (in its effectiveness by
lenders and in its fairness by borrowers) and trust in the propensity of other
agents to comply.38 Consequently, in the absence of the use of pure coercive force,
the determinants of the success of a formal legal system are essentially internal
acceptance rather than external imposition.39 The introduction of an isolated legal
intervention, as the de Soto scheme attempts, is of limited value in the absence of a
“broader respect that exists for legal authority” (Andre and Platteau 1998: 43).
Given that the courts are likely to consider the transfer of poor people’s property
to the banks highly inequitable, they are often reluctant to use compulsion
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(i.e., seizing collateral) to enforce the formal law. Of course, if that is the case, the
formal system becomes, in effect, an informal one, relying on norms.
The ability to enforce contracts will depend on the legitimacy of the contract
and the authority that is responsible for enforcement. Andre and Platteau (1998:
43–4) note that new legal bodies are likely to face constant contestation, criticism,
and harassment not only from the disputant but also from other stakeholders in
the customary system, at least in the context of unpopular decisions. Thus, the
legitimacy of the reform ends up being crucial to its prospects of success. It is
easy for land titling to lose legitimacy; the problem is inherent. If the owner of the
title was clear to everyone, titling wouldn’t be a big deal. In the process of titling,
large numbers of land disputes may have to be resolved. Inequitable resolutions
are likely to be highly salient, when citizens have questions about the government
implementing the program. Titling programs seeming to come from elites may be
viewed as advancing elite interests.
Finally, formal credit contracts, by their very nature, are likely to be more rigid.
Increased formality and rigidity of contracts may contribute to the clarity of the
contract, but also to its inflexibility. The result of this inflexibility is a higher
chance of default, which in turn can lead to higher concentration of land, greater
inequality, and more agency problems. In the long run, overall efficiency may be
impaired as a result of an increase in agency costs (Braverman and Stiglitz 1989).
Moreover, the de Soto approach glosses over the complexities in property rights
that are emphasized in Chapters 1 and 4. In particular, the scheme may actually
heighten rather than reduce uncertainty as a result of the legal dualism that may
be created. In the likely event that, due to these reasons, the formal legal system
fails to decisively trump the customary or informal system, the central goal of
the titling process—increasing certainty in transactions—is defeated. Indeed, the
abrupt introduction of another tier to the property matrix can greatly increase
confusion in transactions (Mackenzie 1993; Platteau 2000; Andre and Platteau
1998).
The Yunus model
There are several factors that have contributed to the relative success of the Yunus
model in extending credit. The absence of collateral requirements removes an
important constraint. The fact that the terms of the contract are more malleable
encourages more people to borrow where they would normally have been deterred
by the more strictly constraining terms of a formal contract. On the supply side as
well, the trust-based system turns out to be greatly advantageous. In particular, the
flexibility of the informal system allows shocks to be internalized in a manner that
would break the back of a more rigidly formal system. The terms of formal
contracts are largely fixed, and changing them is an expensive process involving
high information and procedural costs.40 The terms of an informal contract, on
the other hand, are more easily and economically renegotiated.41 That informal
systems have the latitude to absorb these shocks to quite a significant extent is
demonstrated by the recovery of Grameen in the wake of its 1998 flood-induced
repayment crisis where the redrawing of repayment schedules allowed losses to be
recovered in large part.42 As an ongoing feature, Grameen retains the flexi-loans
that allow individual borrowers to renegotiate their repayment schedules if they
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find it difficult to meet their original targets. (In this sense, informal contracts
can actually manage risk better than formal contracts, even though enhanced
“certainty” is allegedly one of the benefits of the formal system.)
In terms of enforcement, the Yunus model has significant advantages with
regard to the information costs of monitoring. Since the mutual enforcement
model or informal law requires that breaches be observable but not necessarily
publicly verifiable, the information costs associated with it are inherently lower.
Further, peer monitoring (part of at least the early Yunus model) has significant
informational advantages since the community is far better poised than formal
institutions to monitor the actions of borrowers (Stiglitz 1990). Peer monitoring is
able to overcome both problems of moral hazard (Arnott and Stiglitz 1991) and
adverse selection (Ghatak 1999).43 These informational advantages are critical for
the flexibility of design discussed above. Since speculative (sometimes called
strategic) defaults (i.e., an attempt at evading repayment by those who could
make them) can more easily be distinguished from genuine ones (i.e., some
unforeseeable circumstance, such as a natural disaster or sickness in the family),
not only do these contracts have a built-in insurance mechanism against risk, but
they also allow the lender to give loans to those considered riskier borrowers,
making the system inherently more inclusive (Wydick 1999).44
The peer structure also contributes to the credibility of enforcement. The
threats of social sanction and loss of reputation—amplifying the threat of not
refinancing borrowers who default—are far more credible than that of punish-
ment by the state legal system in the context of a country like Bangladesh (Stiglitz
1990; Besley and Coate 1995; Besley 1995). Further, the Grameen’s essentially
participatory character allows the problem of borrower apathy to be overcome
and enforcement to be achieved through internal legitimacy rather than external
force.45
An increasingly important feature contributing to the desire for borrowers to
maintain a positive reputation is the progressive interlinking of markets or the
expansion of Grameen into other markets that affect borrowers, thereby increas-
ing the stakes in the relationship between bank and borrower (Hoff and Stiglitz
1990; Braverman and Stiglitz 1982).46 Grameen has now diversified into areas as
varied as electricity generation, information technology, education, telecommuni-
cations, and textiles. These enterprises are designed to permeate the lives of
borrowers in a variety of different ways. Thus, a person may not only be a
Grameen borrower, but Grameen may at the same time act as her employer,
bank, source of infrastructural facilities, provider of goods and services, and run
her daughter’s school.47 Other factors that add to the incentives of borrowers to
maintain a good reputation include the attractiveness of the support services
provided by the Grameen “bicycle bankers” (Edgcomb and Barton 1998).
Equity
Not surprisingly, the Grameen model performs better not just in terms of effi-
ciency, but also in terms of equity, as assessed by variables such as income,
investment, employment, and property ownership of essentially instrumental
normative interest, as well as welfare indices of inherent value such as gender
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equity, access to education, access to health care, nutritional status, and so on.
This section also looks at some of the broader economic impacts, beyond in-
creased availability of credit, that may have consequences for efficiency as well as
equity.
The de Soto model
Looking first at the economic variables that the de Soto program targets, the
evidence is mixed. On a positive note, the program succeeded in accomplishing its
objective of increasing land titling—several million legal titles having been dis-
tributed in Peru alone. (That means that if credit did not expand, it was not
because of the lack of titling.) In addition, there were significant improvements in
the cost and time involved in the titling process.48 However, to the extent that this
transfer of title involves granting formal rights over property already effectively
controlled by poor Peruvians (i.e., it is a land titling rather than land reform
program and is not fundamentally concerned with redistribution), the value of the
program derives from gains from the change in de facto to de jure rights of
ownership, i.e., the benefits of legal ownership. The economic benefits of this
change in status have already been cast in doubt because of its failure to have the
postulated effect on access to credit. However, there is some indication that there
may be other economic benefits. First, there is some evidence that titling leads to
increased household investment—or investment in the maintenance and im-
provement of titled property (Galliani and Schargrodsky 2005).49 Whether overall
investment actually increases, given that credit supply does not increase, has been
questioned (Carter and Olinto 2003). It may be that the increase in household
investment is the product of a reallocation of funds from one category to another,
i.e., the increase in fixed investment (in the property) may come at the cost of
movable investment (including consumption). The net welfare effects of such a
shift are ambiguous.50 Second, some studies find that titling leads to increased
labor force participation rates. It is hypothesized that this is because titled families
need to spend less time defending their property, leaving them more time for
productive activities (Field 2007; Galliani and Schargrodsky 2005). However, the
validity of the finding by Field (2007) on increased labor supply—cited widely by
advocates of the program—has been brought into question, especially by Mitchell
(2005).51 Indeed, many other local commentators observe that the foundations for
security of occupation may be diverse, and that titling may only have made an
appreciable difference in newer, more insecure communities.52 This accords with
studies in the academic literature that establish that titling is most useful in
situations where informal rights are weak or in the case of vulnerable households
(e.g., Lanjouw and Levy 2002).53 Nonetheless, even if titling’s economic benefits
have yet to be established, it may have certain positive social effects associated
with increased security of ownership and the creation of relatively settled
communities.
However, there is a downside to titling, with potentially important social and
economic consequences: while the program grants more secure rights of owner-
ship to the poor, it simultaneously makes rights of ownership more easily alien-
able. The social impacts of the potential loss of land by poor occupiers may be
grave. De Soto’s model is effectively a strategy of inducing the poor to risk their
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major asset or resource—land. As their only means of insurance, the impact of the
loss of even a fraction of a household’s land would likely be disproportionately
severe, and the loss of all of their land would result in the social and economic
problem of landlessness.54 The strategy is rendered even more risky because it is
proposed in the absence of any accompanying welfare schemes, such as health
care or food subsidies or any training or assistance programs that might increase
productivity, thereby increasing the likelihood of distress sales of land. (The risk is
even greater in the presence of inadequately regulated lenders, who can engage in
predatory lending practices, taking advantage especially of those who are less
financially sophisticated.) An alternative—less risky—approach would be to offer
a part of the produce of the land as collateral instead of the land itself.
Any land titling program has to confront the problem of inequities (and
sometimes illegitimacy) of the initial holdings. For instance, it may be inequitable
to distribute land to squatter families currently occupying it. Endemic to de Soto’s
scheme is that the completely landless—the most destitute in a community—are
left out of its ambit altogether. Further, it is those who were most successful in
breaking the law before the de Soto reform (squatting on others’ land), that are not
only rewarded by it but also expected to become “law-abiding citizens” overnight.
(Titling large landholders who may have obtained their ownership rights from a
colonial power may be even more problematic.)
While the economic benefits of land titling seem limited, so too are the ancillary
welfare benefits. There is some evidence of a tangential impact on school attend-
ance of children of titled families (Galliani and Schargrodsky 2005; Field 2007),
but no direct evidence of other indices improving as a result of participation in the
program (except, perhaps, through any increases in income that may result from
increased labor force participation).55
However, some studies have found that titling has a positive effect on some
indices of gender equity. In cases of joint titling, in particular, a positive impact
has been found on the woman’s position in the household (Field 2003; Datta
2006). In addition, titling has been found to be associated with decreased house-
hold size. Again, this is attributed to a reduction in the need to maintain large
families for reasons of security (Galliani and Schargrodsky 2005) and to increased
contraception use and decision-making power on the part of women (Field 2003).
On the other hand, at least in some contexts, titling may have adverse gender
impacts. Titling is frequently associated with the loss of the customary rights of
vulnerable communities. Since, due to the complexity and nuance of customary
rights, it is impossible for registration to merely recognize and record accurately
existing rights, it invariably involves some de facto reallocation of rights (Barrows
and Roth 1989: 21). Further, since the sections of the population likely to have the
most significant interface with the formal system are the most privileged, this
reallocation is likely to be at the cost of the most vulnerable, leading to a legitimacy
deficit in the reforms. In this way, customary rights are likely to be destroyed by
the registration process. The erosion of customary law weakens, in turn, other
aspects of the “informal” economy, e.g., with respect to risk-sharing. For instance,
in many societies, women have an informal entitlement to a portion of the harvest
of their husband’s land, but these claims are often destroyed by the titling
process—with broad implications for the welfare of not just the woman, but
also the family as a whole.
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Similarly, it is customary in many societies for a woman separated from her
husband to be entitled to a portion of her father’s land in order to avoid destitu-
tion—but again, titling often displaces these rights. The introduction of individual-
ized formal property rights fundamentally disrupts the system of communitarian
norms that bind groups (especially families), enabling them to act as an insurance
and welfare net—especially in contexts where the state, and formal systems more
generally, conspicuously fail to do so. Platteau (2000) and Andre and Platteau
(1998) find compelling evidence of these kinds of effects in the context of Rwanda.
Cousins et al. (2005) reiterate this in the context of South Africa. Specifically, several
studies find that titling has an adverse impact on women’s rights where it formalizes
already existing inequities of power (Lastarria-Cornhiel 1997) or undermines
systems of customary justice (Kevane and Gray 1999; Hare, Yang, and Englander
2007). Further, although some empirical studies find that the social justice problem
can be overcome by explicitly registering land in the name of vulnerable groups of
people (such as women), there is evidence that it is particularly difficult for these
people to access the formal justice system to vindicate their rights (Lastarria-
Cornhiel, Agurto, Brown, and Rosales 2003; Fenrich and Higgins 2001).56 (Indeed,
even targeted programs in general tend to benefit the best-off within the class they
target; for instance, the Indian system of reservation for the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes tends to benefit the socioeconomic class within the caste that least
needs reform, frequently called the “creamy layer.” Thus, despite titling targeting
squatters, it may fail to impact the most needy among them.)
Finally, the titling process may be extremely amenable to appropriation by the
powerful. The more unequal a society, the greater the likelihood of such exploit-
ation of vulnerable categories by officials and others.57 Widespread evidence of
this can be found in Thailand (Thomson et al. 1986; Feeny 1988); India (Wadhwa
1989; Viswanath 1977); Latin America and the Caribbean (Stanfield 1990);
Uganda (Doornbos 1975); Nigeria (Zubair 1987); and South Africa (Cousins
et al. 2005). The inequities of this process are likely to be exacerbated if registra-
tion comes at a fee, as in the Peruvian case, rather than being free.
Neither the absence of broader social impacts nor the reinforcement of existing
inequities is surprising. Unlike the microfinance program, the de Soto scheme is
not attached to any explicit social agenda. De Soto’s starting point is the existing
power allocation. He is not concerned with inequity, but rather with leveraging
existing power allocations to achieve a more efficient outcome—to achieve a
Pareto improvement. His primary focus is on the economic losses he associates
with the “dead capital” of untitled land in the developing world. Not have titling
programs, with their strategy of achieving social change through efficiency enhance-
ment, diversified organically into different social sectors in the way that the micro-
finance movement has.
The Yunus model
From the start, the Grameen Bank had a social agenda. Its intention was to
bring credit to the very poor.58 It could more easily have delivered credit to
poor communities by enhancing access to the credit among the (still quite
poor) local elites. But it chose not to do this, and to go the opposite direction,
giving credit to the least powerful—women in very poor families. In doing so,
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Yunus wanted not just to increase their livelihood, but to alter power relation-
ships. Given these objectives, it is not surprising that, although Grameen started
out as a credit access program, its agenda very quickly evolved to become
far more broad—adopting what policymakers in Bangladesh are calling a
“microfinance plus” approach. Grameen targets economic variables mainly by
attempting to increase income through access to credit, but it also facilitates
property ownership (both through funding the acquisition of “business assets”
and the provision of housing loans), engages in employment-generating activ-
ities, and provides direct avenues and instruments of investment and insurance.
It is increasingly proactive in its approach to welfare indices of inherent value.
Its focus so far has most explicitly been on education—it provides both educa-
tion loans and scholarships, as well as funding for schools. In addition, it has
begun addressing nutritional concerns by getting involved in the production
of high-nutrient, low-cost food and clean, low-cost drinking water.59 It is
currently actively working to extend its reach to the health care sector.60 Its
commitment to female empowerment is explicit, lending almost exclusively to
women.61 (We will discuss later a number of other aspects of its female empower-
ment agenda.)
The evidence is that not only did Grameen succeed in increasing the flow of
credit, but that there were broader economic and social benefits.62 Several studies
show that participation in the Grameen program leads to increased household
income. Grameen reports that average household income is 50 percent higher for
members in Grameen villages than residents of non-Grameen villages.63 These
claims of increased income are backed by objective third-party assessments,
although the magnitude of the benefits reported by these studies is typically
more conservative (Khandker 1998; Hossain 1988).64 Second, participation in
the Grameen program appears to be associated with a decrease in poverty at the
household level. Grameen reports that a significantly smaller proportion of its
members live in poverty (20 percent) compared with nonmembers (56 percent).65
Further, Yunus reports that 64 percent of Grameen members decisively move out
of poverty within five years of joining the program.66 The reach of the program
heightens the significance of this achievement—80 percent of poor families are
estimated to have access to microfinance in Bangladesh.67 But while the objectivity
of this data may be subject to question, several independent studies also find
evidence of reduced poverty indices in Grameen households (Hossain 1988), as
well as an improved socioeconomic status (Wahid 1994).68 There is, however, some
controversy about the macro-level impacts of microfinance on poverty reduction. In
a well-regarded study using panel data, Khandker (1998) finds that aggregate
poverty in Bangladesh is decreasing by only 1 percent per annum. Moreover,
Bateman and Chang (2009) have argued more broadly against using microfinance
as a systemic poverty reduction strategy on the basis that it detracts focus from a
more fundamental state-driven structural transformation of the economy that
would ultimately yield deeper and wider returns. But while the microfinance
organizations may have overstated their impact on poverty alleviation and it
appears unlikely that it can, by itself, substantially impact poverty—the data
suggests that microfinance makes at least a modest contribution to poverty reduc-
tion.69 There is evidence, moreover, that Grameen has had positive effects on some
important welfare indicators. For instance, various studies have found positive
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effects on contraception use by women (Schuler and Hashemi 1994; Amin, Li, and
Ahmed 1996; Schuler, Hashemi, and Riley 1997).
There are broader economic benefits, especially to women, that arise from how
the Grameen program is structured. Grameen membership requires internalizing
a number of different types of prudential practices. Potential members must learn
to sign their names and memorize a list of sixteen decisions (such as sending
children to school, family planning, basic cleanliness and sanitation, vows of
cooperation, etc.) before they are eligible for a loan. In addition, although there
is little substantive interference with use of loans (though they are limited to
production, as opposed to consumption, and the focus on production itself may
have broader benefits), members are provided with ongoing assistance in the form
of encouragement and troubleshooting advice in the face of financial troubles.
There is evidence of these noncredit, participatory aspects having a positive effect
on self-employment profits (McKernan 2002). Indeed, the empowerment dimen-
sion of the scheme is one of its key assets.
An important contribution of Grameen has been the creation of an entire
second generation of beneficiaries. Reportedly, 100 percent of the children of
Grameen families were enrolled in school. Grameen is attempting to actively
promote a rapid socioeconomic transition of this second wave of beneficiaries
through primary school scholarships, of which there are now 64,000 recipients,
and higher education loans, of which 23,000 have been distributed.70
It is not surprising that, given its focus on empowering women, the Grameen
Bank is considered to have made a significant contribution to gender equity,
particularly in the context of Bangladesh. The fact that 97 percent of Grameen
borrowers are women is an achievement in its own right, especially in a country
where women undertaking activities outside the home is itself stigmatized.71 In
addition, studies have found a positive impact on a number of other empowerment
indices. Using surveys, Pitt, Khandker, and Cartwright (2003) find that participa-
tion in credit programs leads women to take a bigger role in household decision-
making, greater access to financial and economic resources, better social networks,
improved bargaining power vis-à-vis their husbands, greater mobility, and better
spousal communication.72 Moreover, Hashemi, Schuler, and Riley (1996) find
that even the most “minimalist” credit programs—or those that do not emphasize
female empowerment—have an emancipating effect on women.73 Though the
impact of microfinance on female empowerment arises partly from the additional
economic resources that it puts at the disposal of women, the structuring of the
program strengthens these effects. For instance, to consolidate the woman’s position
in the household, mortgages given out by the Bank are always made in the name of
the woman as a disincentive against her husband divorcing her. Moreover, although
there is some evidence of increased domestic violence in the short run (Rahman
1999), other studies find that the Grameen mechanism paves the way to greater
assertiveness on the part of women and reduced domestic violence, particularly over
time (Schuler, Hashemi, Riley, and Akhtar 1996; Schuler, Hashemi, and Badal
1998). In addition, positive impacts have been found on specific welfare indices
such as women’s health (Nanda 1999). The emphasis on women may not just be a
matter of equity. Pitt and Khandker (1998) find that annual household consump-
tion expenditure increases by 18 taka for every additional taka borrowed by women
from these credit programs, compared with 11 taka for men.74
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Finally, microfinance contributes to releasing the untapped economic potential
of the female labor supply in Bangladesh. Emran, Morshed, and Stiglitz (2007)
explain that microfinance works essentially because of imperfections in the capital
and labor markets. As long as two of these markets function perfectly, mobile
factors move to the immobile one, ensuring overall efficiency. In the more realistic
context of imperfect capital and labor markets, microfinance harnesses the un-
tapped labor power of unemployed women in the home, thereby evening out
capital–labor ratios. In this way, a productive section of the population, women,
left out of the labor market due to market imperfections, have their productivity
enhanced. We should emphasize that many of the ancillary benefits of Grameen
bank are not the inevitable consequence of microfinance schemes, but depend on
the particular way the program has been structured; but some are intrinsic to the
trust-based approach that emphasizes group lending and peer monitoring. Still,
the fact that other Bangladeshi microfinance schemes, most notably BRAC, have
not only replicated Grameen’s success, but in some dimensions may have
exceeded it, suggests both that the model’s success is not just the fortuitous result
of having good leadership (Yunus), and that it may be replicable. Indeed, BRAC’s
programs in female legal and health education and its innovative schooling
programs have enhanced social benefits and female empowerment; and its eco-
nomic programs entailing vertical integration (e.g., not just giving members loans
to raise chickens, but also entering into the production of chicken feed and the
like) have increased its economic impact. All of this suggests that there is
something to the traditional not-for-profit microfinance programs that makes
for their successes.
Static analysis
Contrary to the predictions of the Chicago School, the Yunus model outperforms
the de Soto model in terms both of its efficiency and equity. In this section, we
analyze the reasons for this result—tracing them to the fundamentally different
visions of development that motivate the two programs.
One of the essential differences between de Soto’s and Yunus’s approaches is
that the latter takes a more integrated view of development. By contrast, de Soto’s
approach falls into the category of linear models of development (of which the
Washington Consensus approach is typical)—assuming that targeting certain
critical, albeit isolated, variables will bring about development.75 Indeed, it is
this perspective that informs de Soto’s assertion that stimulating capitalism in
the developing world is merely a question of implementing the strategic interven-
tion of titling to bring “dead capital alive.” The problem with this position is its
failure to recognize crucial linkages between economic, legal, and social systems.76
Further, his exclusive focus on economic variables of instrumental interest,
rather than welfare variables of inherent interest, stems from a seeming belief that
overall efficiency and the well-being of poor people will follow almost automatic-
ally, once life is given to the dead capital. There are further distinctions, discussed
below, in conceptions of the dynamics of development.
The notion that land titling (and the rule of law more generally) would be
decisive in changing the course of development is predicated on the belief that
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markets in general work well—or would work well—if only there were a rule of law.
But market failures are pervasive even in countries with reasonably good legal
systems. Given that markets in the developing world are riddled with imperfec-
tions—ranging from externalities to information asymmetries—it is not surprising
that simply titling, or bringing a rule of law, does not, on its own, bring development.
It was not only the economic assumptions underlying the de Soto scheme
that were flawed. As the Introduction to this book and Chapter 4 point out, the
assumptions about “law” and “property rights” were overly simplistic and unrealis-
tic. For instance, while the working of the titling mechanism is predicated on a well-
functioning legal system, the view of the law he adopts is highly formalistic—vesting
paramount faith in law as written down in the statute books, as well as the formal
structures of the law. On one hand, de Soto advocates incorporating into the formal
code elements of successful informal practice, thereby paying homage to the
dynamism of the informal economy and the informal norms that make such an
economy function. On the other, he makes a definitive formalist leap by assuming
the inevitability of the need to formalize these norms and practices—irrespective of
how well the informal system may be working. This takes for granted, contrary to
much empirical evidence, that the process of writing rules down dramatically
improves their efficacy. For example, he asks us to “listen to the barking dogs” or
to heed evidence of informal delineation of property rights in the developing
world—boundaries, he argues, that are well, if informally, established. But, as we
have discussed at length, the formalization process is far from trivial—and fre-
quently introduces distortions in the system in its own right. It assumes, further,
that once laws are written down, they can be interpreted and applied completely
objectively, eliminating any role for norms. Language inevitably entails ambiguity,77
disputes arise, and those resolving disputes will rely partially on norms. Moreover,
he ignores the transaction costs associated with implementing the formal legal
system—and the fact that in almost every society, there are costs in getting full
access to its benefits. The poor are at a disadvantage. Though the rule of law may
protect against some abuses of power, the formal legal system itself favors those who
are better off, and especially so in the context of property disputes. (Public legal
assistance redresses the imbalance, but only partially, since the quality of legal
assistance is almost always markedly less than that available to the rich.)
Finally, and most critically, de Soto neglects the fact that the best way of arriving
at a good legal system is not through external imposition but rather through
drawing agents into the system through a process of building internal legitimacy.
Too often, it is foreign experts and the country’s own elites that push most
strongly for titling programs, and this in itself arouses suspicion and can under-
mine the legitimacy of the whole process: is the objective of the program really to
empower poor citizens or to provide another tool through which the wealthy can
accumulate more wealth for themselves?
Yunus, while acknowledging the merits of the market mechanism, also recog-
nizes that markets are far from perfect and riddled with barriers to access. Indeed,
his whole approach is premised on a set of market failures (access to credit, access
to jobs) and the recognition that political and economic inequalities could be
self-perpetuating. Thus, his solution to the access-to-credit problem is far more
substantive, providing loans directly, not just removing what was viewed as the
(only) barrier to access, the absence of collateral.
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Further, he is focused directly on welfare variables of inherent normative
interest as a result of both a lack of faith in the market mechanisms to provide
them spontaneously, as well as in deference to their importance for the success of
the market process. He realized that among the market failures was lack of
effective competition; but the imbalance of market power was matched by an
imbalance of political power. It would be elites who design the formal legal system,
and it is they who implement it. It is they who adjudicate disputes. Inevitably, a
formal legal system works to the disadvantage of the poor. Grameen was designed
to improve the well-being of the poorest of the poor, in a context in which they
lacked both economic resources and political power.
Rather than relying on formal law and coercion to enforce contracts, Yunus
constructed a system in which social and economic incentives sufficed to ensure
repayment. The system works because it is able to effectively solicit the participa-
tion of agents in the enforcement system by drawing them into it through building
up internal legitimacy. This final point accounts for Yunus’s relative success in
soliciting cooperative behavior on the part of program participants—all the more
laudable in a context in which the formal legal system has found it notoriously
hard to establish a framework for cooperative action.78
The Grameen experiment showed that informal, norm-based regulatory inter-
ventions—more rooted in social context and inherently more participatory—are
much more likely to be seen as legitimate and, hence, to be more efficient than the
impersonal structures of conventional law. (They are more efficient in that they
enabled more individuals to have access to credit and more efficient in having a
lower default rate.)
Indeed, the success of the informal Grameen mechanism is not an isolated
phenomenon. Earlier, we referred to other successful microfinance schemes.
There are a number of other examples where “informal” law replaces formal
legal structures. A host of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms have been
successfully implemented in various parts of the developing world, illustrating the
flexibility, responsiveness, and accessibility of these systems relative to more
formal ones.79 While they may operate in the broader context of a more formal
legal framework, their ability to tap into informal resources, such as shared values,
community norms, and networks, and their emphasis on consensus-driven con-
flict resolution enable them to deliver cheaper and more expedient justice than
their formal counterparts. At the same time, an emergent voice within academia is
starting to call for more innovative—if less ambitious—regulatory solutions.80
The “rule of law” regime may be the proverbial institutional “cake”—a luxury in
the context of much of the developing world that is unattainable, even if it is
desirable. But there is a pressing need to focus instead on what Galanter and
Krishnan (2004) call legal “bread for the poor”—functional institutional solutions
that are realistic in the context of the developing world.
Dynamics
In the previous section we saw that the Yunus model performs better than the de
Soto model, at least in the short run: It has been more successful in extending
credit, increasing incomes, and advancing a variety of social goals.
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These successes come in spite of arguments in favor of the rule of law over the
often more arbitrary “rule of persons.”81 But if the Yunus model is to succeed in
reducing poverty at a macro-level, it must “scale up” its operations. This can take
the form of widening reach in terms of a proliferation of organizations providing
microfinance, as well as increasing the scale and range of the ventures that poor
families are able to tap into, thereby allowing them to access wider resources and
be lifted out of poverty more effectively.
Both developments are currently under way in Bangladesh. In recent years,
there has been an explosion of organizations entering the fray to provide micro-
finance, and Grameen (along with other major microfinance providers, notably
BRAC), has been increasingly diversifying into social businesses—higher-scale
business ventures that poor families would be unable to establish in their own
right that either provide crucial services to the poor at subsidized rates or that
allocate part of their surpluses to poor people.82 This scaling up of operations has,
not surprisingly, been accompanied by an increasing move toward formal regula-
tion. The microfinance sector as a whole (particularly following the entry of new
organizations into the sector) is progressively more formally regulated—first by
the Palli Karma Sahayak Foundation (PKSF) and now by the Microcredit Regula-
tory Authority (MRA). At the same time, the social businesses sector into which
the microfinance organizations are moving are mostly regulated as any other
business enterprise, by formal law.83 These developments indicate that while a trust-
based system seems to work effectively in regulating small lending transactions
between the microfinance organization and a network of up to several million
individuals, as the size of transactions get bigger and the unit of regulation becomes
larger (i.e., organizations rather than individuals), formal law may become more
necessary.84 While the microfinance sector in Bangladesh was dominated by a few
key players, entry into the sector did not need formal regulation (they had an
incentive to behave well, and so long as they were small, the consequences of
misbehavior were limited), but as the number of players increased and incidents
of fraud began to occur, there arose a need for regulation.85
These empirical insights accord with theory. Dixit (2004) has stressed that the
expansion of the market may demand a more generalized form of trust that will
allow anonymous actors to transact with each other on a wider scale on the basis
of mutual trust in the institutions of the economy rather than a network in which
names and faces matter. This is somewhat analogous to the move from the barter
to the money economy, facilitating exchange on a wider scale. Thus, for instance, a
Grameenphone subscriber purchases a subscription not on the basis of a personal
trust in the service provider, but rather as a more impersonal market transac-
tion.86 Moreover, changes brought about by economic growth and development
may themselves undermine the effectiveness of informal regulation, which
depends, for instance, on stable communities (repeated interaction). With devel-
opment, individuals move easily in and out of communities, undermining the
effectiveness of the social and economic sanctions that can be applied against a
party that has broken “trust” (Stiglitz 2000).87
The appropriate choice of institution depends fundamentally on the stage of
development and context of the society in question. The trajectory of institutional
development in Bangladesh illustrates this: as the process of development pro-
gressed, the institutional framework changed to adapt to it. Indeed, what is crucial
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is not whether the mode of regulation is formal or informal, but rather the
influence exerted over the actions of agents.88 Without a transmission mechanism
allowing formal law to acquire traction in a host society by altering actions and
norms, legal formalization will have little or no effect—as was the case in Peru. In
successful legal systems, formal law and social norms work in tandem. Formal
legislation has the capacity to shape norms and influence action;89 but if they are
to do this successfully, they cannot be imposed from above or from the outside.
In the context of the developing world, abruptly introduced and isolated
legislative interventions are bound to fail to have the same effect that they might
in a developed country that adopted them after lengthy political debate and
consensus formation, given that these interventions do not emerge out of an
organic process of institutional growth and thereby lack internal legitimacy.
This is what we observe in the Peruvian case.
While we have stressed the efficiency and equity benefits of the Grameen
mechanism, its key contribution in institutional terms is its capacity to make the
shift to a cooperative institutional equilibrium by fostering social capital and trust,
i.e., by causing a revolution within the agents in the system.90 In the framework of
the Hoff and Stiglitz (2008) model, individual expectations with regard to the
prospects for establishing the rule of law determine individual support for it.91
The Grameen mechanism can be seen to be producing a public good by
creating social capital, changing perceptions about social interactions, and pos-
sibly altering expectations about the rule of law.92 This was especially the case for
BRAC, which has had explicit programs enhancing participants’ knowledge of,
and access to, “the law,” especially in domains that are vital to their lives.93
Dowla (2006) provides a roster of ways in which the Grameen is engaged in
social capital creation—by “forming horizontal and vertical networks, establish-
ing new norms and fostering a new level of social trust to solve the collective
action problems of poor people’s access to capital.” Social capital theory predicts
that cooperation will beget further cooperation (Hirschman 1984; Putnam 1993;
Seabright 1997), and in the instance of the Grameen, this has been the case—both
within and outside of the specific program.94 A notable example of these spillovers
is the election of Grameen members to local government bodies. In the 2003 local
government election (the Union Porishad), 7442 Grameen members contested the
reserved seats for women and 3059 members were elected—this accounts for 24
percent of the total women’s reserved seats.95
The social capital building initiatives of the early stages of institutional devel-
opment of the Grameen paved the way for current developments. The successes
of both the newer microfinance organizations that entered the fray after the
Grameen Bank and BRAC (like ASA, now the third biggest microfinance pro-
vider in Bangladesh) and the social businesses run by the bigger microfinance
organizations was enabled by the foundations laid by the first-generation micro-
finance experiment. The familiarity established vis-à-vis the “technology” of
microfinance and the improved norms inculcated by the older microfinance
institutions greatly reduced the investment of time and effort required of the
newer institutions in establishing themselves. At the same time, the positive
reputation of the bigger microfinance institutions has been critical both in
attracting the investment and creating the client base that has fuelled the social
business sector in Bangladesh.
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However, a process of informal consensus and social capital building often
works to effectively pave the way to more formal legal systems, which will play a
more important role in later stages of development. The issue, then, ends up being
not one of choosing between the formal and informal system, as the Chicago
School posits it, but rather one of determining which type of intervention is more
appropriate to emphasize at a particular stage of development.
We end this section on a note of caution: evolutionary processes do not always
work in the ways that we would hope. It is not always easy to distinguish the
crucial aspects of an institutional arrangement. Consider microfinance. We
have argued that its success was dependent not just (or even so much) on the
provision of credit to the poor, but there were those who thought otherwise.
They thought that microfinance had proven so successful that it could be
converted into a profit-making institution, which would provide incentives to
extend its reach, providing more finance to more poor people. But the change
from a not-for-profit model to a for-profit model fundamentally changes incen-
tives. Many microfinance schemes outside of Bangladesh have been for profit. In
that context, the same incentives for predatory lending that marked the US
subprime market arise in developing countries. Private firms have recognized
that there is money at the bottom of the pyramid, and rather than freeing it up
for the benefit of the poor, have done what they could to move it to themselves.
Such concerns are central to the de Soto approach, which relies on private
markets. If legal systems are controlled by those who profit from the poor,
they will do little to stop predatory lending. The legal system will then become
an instrument for increasing inequality.
IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA
The previous section describes and analyzes two alternative models of institu-
tional evolution. One advocated the rapid Westernization and formalization of
law; the other adopted an approach of institutional gradualism—building slowly
on informal networks. In this section, we return to our original focus and consider
the relevance of the foregoing discussion for China.
It is clear that formal law has not been a major contributing factor in China’s
remarkable economic growth (Qian 2003; Clarke, Murrell, and Whiting 2008;
Upham 2009). At the point at which China embarked on the reform process in the
1970s, few of its legal institutions had survived the Cultural Revolution and it
possessed little substantive law for the courts to enforce, particularly in the realm
of private property rights (Lubman 1999). Even though the government started
promulgating lawlike rules and regulations in the 1980s, there was no comprehen-
sive protection of private property until the Property Law of 2007 (Lubman 1999).
Chinese courts are well known for “local protectionism”—or their refusal to rule
against the interests of entities within their own localities. Moreover, they are
known to be even less inclined to go against the interests of politically strong
entities—and the party-state has the formal power to intervene when important
interests are at stake (Liebman 2007). Thus, Chinese courts are unlikely to protect
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private property against the Party, the state, or even private entities with whom
they have close ties (Upham 2009).
How, then, can the Chinese experience be understood? What mechanisms—
in the absence of legally defined property rights enforceable in courts—allow
economic agents to form the reliable expectations that are the cornerstone of
economic transactions? Different authors stress different aspects of the Chinese
legal and institutional structures to explain this process. Some have argued
China’s success demonstrates the irrelevance of property rights. Some argue
that there really is a system of private ownership “dressed-up” as public
ownership. What is clear is that China’s experience is at odds with the claims
of those like de Soto who contend that well-defined property rights (in the
de Soto sense) are necessary (and almost sufficient) for robust and sustained
economic growth.96
Guanxi is one important, albeit intangible, factor in Chinese economic pro-
cesses. Guanxi—which can be loosely translated into “connections” or “relations,”
but means, in essence, “particularistic ties”97—is acknowledged to be an essential,
pervasive, and resilient lubricating factor in Chinese social relations and economic
transactions (Gold, Guthrie, andWank 2002). There persist debates about whether
guanxi is a uniquely Chinese concept or essentially the same as the more generic
social capital but, as with social capital, guanxi is understood to have both positive
and negative connotations.
Much of the literature has tended to take a negative view of it, considering it to
be synonymous with corruption and an impediment to the establishment of the
formal rule of law. A more positive view can see it as playing a crucial role in
Chinese economic processes—providing consistency in transactions that would
otherwise be missing in the absence of formal rules. Some view guanxi as a
substitute for formal law (Wang 1989; Zheng 1986). Indeed, it is argued by
some scholars that despite attempts at legal formalization in China, Chinese
business practices still view Western-style contracts as a “cage” that the appropri-
ate guanxi can unlock (Lubman 1998).
Most significantly, the changing character of guanxi in the era of reforms is
debated. There is speculation with regard to whether its importance will persist or
even expand, or whether it will wither and be replaced by the formal rule of
law. Potter (2001) takes that the view that with the emergence of formal law in
China, the complementarities between the formal rules of the legal system and the
informal rules and norms of guanxi relations are starting to be strengthened.
Guanxi serves to provide predictability and stability in a legal system that is new,
in flux, and incomplete.
That China achieved its remarkable growth in the absence of Chicago-style
formal legal structures appears uncontroversial. Although debate persists about
the precise institutional mechanisms that enabled this growth, it is safe to say that
both institutions rooted in China’s particular context (such as TVEs, whose
“ownership structure” does not fit neatly into the standard law and economics
property paradigm) and informal mechanisms such as guanxi played an import-
ant role. While the pressures of sustaining growth and further integration into the
global economy may impose some pressures to follow the conventional path of
legal formalization, some caution should be exercised to ensure that this process
does not erode the institutional structures that have served China so well for so
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long and that the formal structures that are adopted are appropriately adapted to
China’s distinctive circumstances today, as well as to its history.
CONCLUSION
In the context of the policy choices currently confronting China, this chapter
critically examines the Chicago School’s assertion that formal law is essential
for development. This claim was examined by comparing two high-profile
credit-access programs—land titling in Peru and microfinance in Bangladesh—
representing two alternative models of institutional evolution that China could
follow. A close analysis of the two models revealed that contrary to the claims of
the Chicago School, informal norms and codes of conduct can support productive
economic exchange, and thereby be conducive to development. In fact, the more
informal Yunus model proved to be both more efficient and more equitable
than the legal formalization program advocated by de Soto. But a system that
might work well at one stage of development may not do so at a later stage. We
suggest not only that at later stages of development, formal systems may have
distinct advantages, but also that earlier stages of social capital building through
informal regulation may pave the way to more formalized regulation more
effectively than the approach of rapid, and somewhat abrupt, immediate for-
malization. In reconciling the static and dynamic analysis, the focus of the legal
reform process is no longer that of choosing between legal formality and infor-
mality as traditionally posited, but, rather, becomes that of determining the
pacing and sequencing of reforms, and what mode of regulation works better in
a particular context. We have shown the critical role played by the interactive
dynamics between the formal and informal systems.
A hallmark of China’s development strategy is recognizing this—and con-
stantly adapting its strategy. We have identified arguments suggesting that, over
the long run, there may be certain economic benefits associated with formal
regulation. But the critique of the de Soto model is of particular relevance to
China, as it proceeds in formalizing property rights. We have shown the risks of
growing inequality, especially in the context of a society with an inadequate
system of social protection; we have seen too the risk of formal legal systems
that are disjointed from social norms; we have shown how the rule of law can
protect existing inequities, and differential access to legal redress can be used to
increase those inequities. By contrast, we have seen how informal institutions can
help create “social capital” that promotes equality (a harmonious society) and
actually enhances efficiency, with spillovers into other contexts.
Applying the lessons of this analysis to China, we see that as China negotiates
its developmental pathway, it should steer clear of the false dichotomies of the
Chicago School mode of thinking, noting the failure of attempts to implement the
received institutional wisdom of de Soto-style rapid formalization programs, and
draw on the experience of relatively successful alternative institutional experi-
ments of the Yunus type. To encapsulate this wisdom in the words of an ancient
Chinese proverb: “He who treads softly goes far.”
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NOTES
1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Initiative for Policy Dialogue’s
China Task Force Meeting in Manchester (June 25–6, 2008). The authors are indebted
to David Kennedy, the participants at the meeting, and to anonymous peer reviewers
for their valuable comments and suggestions, as well as to interviewees in both Peru
and Bangladesh for their help and participation.
2. See, on China, Prosterman and Hanstead (2006). On the institutional prescription of
the Chicago School for the developing world, more generally, see Posner (1998). Some
scholars, while recognizing that China has done remarkably well without the kinds of
legal system (property rights) that they argue are essential, suggest that without legal
reforms, China’s growth will not be sustainable.
3. Commission for the Legal Empowerment of the Poor (2008: 4–5). We agree with their
estimate that the quantum of “legal poverty” is immense, but not with their solution to
the problem.
4. See further Haldar (2007) and Pistor, Haldar, and Amirapu (2009). Various attempts
have been made to explain the failure of formal legal reform in the developing world;
for instance, one strain of literature analyzes the issue in terms of “legal transplants.”
See Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard (2003).
5. While it is not obvious that Chinese property rights operate in the same way as
Western property rights, attempts have been made to explain its success in terms of
setting up Western-style incentive structures at the margins. See, for instance, Qian
(2003).
6. Aoki (2001), for instance, entirely sidesteps the formal–informal dichotomy by classi-
fying as an “institution” only things that actually impact the behavior of agents. While
this position overcomes many of the shortcomings of a more formalistic approach
conceptually, it leaves the question of the functional choice of approach to reform
unanswered.
7. We refer not just to the microfinance and titling programs, but also to their architects,
Yunus and de Soto, to highlight the fundamental ideological differences that these two
eminent figures in development bring to their programs. Indeed, we are interested
as much in the theoretical models as the practical implementation of the reform
programs.
8. Yunus (1998) and de Soto (2000). We do not evaluate whether increased access does in
fact lead to development or whether differences between the two systems regarding
who gets access to credit shapes economic evolution differently. There is growing
consensus that both Yunus and de Soto exaggerated the importance of credit availabil-
ity, especially for long-term development, though microfinance has had significant
achievements in poverty alleviation.
9. It is not, in that sense, a land or property redistribution reform. An important part of
the program in Peru dealt with squatters (on land otherwise “unowned”) who were
giving formal rights to the land (housing) that they occupied. (One of the problems
discussed below is that there are often ambiguities in “ownership,” and resolving these
may be no easy matter.)
10. This is the main change characterizing the shift from the “classical”Grameen model, or
Grameen I, to the “generalized” Grameen model, or Grameen II. This change was put
in place between 2000–2 and started as a response to a 1998 repayment crisis resulting
from severe floods in Bangladesh. The opportunity was taken, however, to incorporate
structural changes to the system in order to make it more flexible. Some of the changes
are as follows: (i) The various categories of loans were dispensed with and reduced to
the “basic” loan, housing loan, and higher education loan (with a 50 percent reservation
for girls); (ii) The rigidity of loan amounts, repayment schedules, and duration were
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removed and borrowers could now get customized loans on the basis of their repay-
ment record and the discretion of the banker; (iii) Group lending was replaced with
individual lending and groups were retained for the purpose of positive reinforcement
only; (iv) The “flexi-loan” was introduced to enable borrowers to deal with repayment
problems whereby borrowers facing difficulties were able to merely reschedule repay-
ment; (v) The “Beggar Program” disbursing loans to beggars with no repayment rule
attached was started; (vi) The system of positive incentives was reinforced with the
“star scheme” for branches and employees that met targets and “gold membership” for
borrowers with an untarnished record; (vii) The introduction of a pension and
insurance scheme, in addition to obligatory savings. On Grameen II, see further
Yunus (2002) and Dowla and Barua (2006).
11. This law was used to remove Yunus from his position as head of Grameen Bank in
2011. See The New York Times, March 8, 2011.
12. For instance, ILD bases institutional reform on “proposals . . . that will build on well-
established local legal and ‘extralegal’ practices that all citizens can identify with and
respect, streamlining the rules and procedures that govern real estate and business
activities, reducing the time and cost to operate in the legal sector.” See further, <http://
ild.org.pe/>. The modalities of achieving this may, however, be more complex than it
initially appears.
13. For a brief history and overview of the functioning of the Bank, see <http://www.
grameen-info.org/>.
14. For an overview of the Peruvian titling program, see Calderon (2004).
15. On de Soto’s influence in Peru, see Panaritis (2001) and Bromley (1990).
16. Countries currently being advised by ILD include Mexico, Honduras, Haiti, Egypt,
Albania, and the Philippines. In addition, ILD reports that there is “demand” for its
services in forty-seven countries. See <http://ild.org.pe/en/home>. In addition, a
number of countries, such as South Africa, not directly advised by de Soto, are deeply
influenced by his advice; see Cousins et al. (2005).
17. See further, Gilbert (2002: 5); Panaritis (2002: 22).
18. De Soto is, for instance, co-chair of the Commission. See further <http://www.undp.
org/legalempowerment/>.
19. See Sharma (2005a, 2005b).
20. See <http://www.yearofmicrocredit.org/>.
21. See, for instance, World Bank, 1999.
22. More than twenty years ago, Stiglitz provided the intellectual foundations of the
Grameen peer-monitoring system, explaining why it was an effective system of con-
tract enforcement (Stiglitz 1990). In addition, results reported in this paper are based
on extensive field research conducted in Peru and Bangladesh between June 2008 and
July 2009. More than 100 in-depth qualitative interviews were conducted with stake-
holders in the implementation of the programs.
23. To say that the programs have been “replicated” is, however, to gloss over significant
differences. While the microfinance model has spread like wildfire, replicas often
change institutional aspects of the model. Further, even when the replication is
faithful—in form—to the original model, the informal, context-specific aspects cannot
be directly transferred. In particular, the focus on social capital building of the initial
model has been somewhat lost. Indeed, Seibel (2000), studying microfinance replicas in
the Philippines, finds that the most successful replicas are the ones that are most
faithful to the social capital building aspects of the original. Some of the replicas of the
microfinance scheme shifted from a nonprofit to a for-profit basis, a change that Yunus
and others have suggested put at risk the entire program (Yunus 2011). Similarly, in the
case of titling, while the formal process can be replicated, other aspects integral to the
program, such as the judicial system, cannot just be transplanted.
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24. Thus, while Peru might have a better developed market mechanism than Bangladesh,
Bangladesh may have stronger community norms. This difference is crucial in deter-
mining which regulatory mechanism is more appropriate. See further Besley and Coate
(1995).
25. As the problems in America’s mortgage markets make clear, matters are somewhat
more complicated than this simplistic rendering would suggest. The debt contract has to
specify whether the loan is recourse or nonrecourse. A recourse loan means that the
collateral serves as a minimum guarantee (one that might have uncertain value, how-
ever). The borrower is still liable for repayment, unless he goes bankrupt. Thus, there are
background legal structures behind land titling, specifying the terms of enforcement of
contracts and bankruptcy. Norms inevitably play some role in enforcement, though the
legal structure itself determines the extent to which that is so.
26. Note that lenders might be lured into entering a contract on the basis of a belief in the
effectiveness of the enforcement system, but this belief may be false. The recent
subprime mortgages crisis is a paradigmatic example of this. On the other hand,
lenders might be deterred from entering into a contract because the prospects of
enforcement appear unsatisfactory where they might, in fact, be extremely sound. An
extremely trustworthy person might not get a loan of $500, even at an excessive interest
rate, if others don’t believe that the person is trustworthy. But, if you do not believe that
I am, you will not lend me $500 even at a 40 percent interest rate. It is clear that
subjective beliefs are of fundamental importance in determining whether contracts are
undertaken.
27. Although an element of coercion is contained in any state legal system, unless mixed
sufficiently with a voluntary acceptance of the system, the normative implications of
the use of force to keep contracts are highly questionable. This is especially so if the
contract is viewed as “unfair,” either because of an imbalance of economic power at the
time the contract was entered into or because of deception (real or perceived) on the
part of one party to the contract. Note that today, sovereign debt contracts have to rely
on one of the first three modes of enforcement, though in the nineteenth century,
military force was used to enforce them (Stiglitz 2006, 2010). The theory of repeated
games shows how cooperation can be sustained in contexts in which it could not be in a
one-shot game. See Abreu (1988) and Abreu et al. (1990).
28. See Olson (1965), Ostrom (1990), and North (1991). However, in the context of
repeated games (repeated interactions), it may be much easier to achieve cooperative
outcomes. See, e.g., Abreu (1988, 1990).
29. How actors behave rests upon their expectations of whether the rule of law will be
established. This affects whether contracts will be enforced; and beliefs about enforce-
ment affect where loans will be made. There can exist multiple equilibria.
30. COFOPRI (2008).
31. This study of the Peruvian titling program finds (when titles are asked for in the first
place) a small positive impact on public-sector lending and a beneficial impact on
interest rates—but no impact on private-sector lending. More specifically, the bulk of
this positive impact is accounted for by increased in-kind lending of housing con-
struction materials by the publicly funded Materials Bank (MB). Various hypotheses
are put forward for this discrepancy, although the cause remains unclear. While the
paper suggests that the MB generally issues large loans and therefore faces relatively
lower transaction costs of dealing with titled property, it appears more likely that the
differential impact is inherent in the MB being a government bank and adopting an
explicit policy of lending on the basis of the titles distributed. As Mitchell (2005)
points out, this is an interesting result since the only increase in access to credit
that did occur was not through the market process, but most likely through public
subsidy.
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32. In terms of access to credit cards, bank accounts, and formal credit (from banks, the
government, labor unions, or cooperatives), the study finds no difference between titled
and nontitled households, with both groups continuing to rely largely on informal
credit sources. The small positive effect found is accounted for by 4 percent of titled
households receiving mortgage loans.
33. Grameen Bank Annual Report (2009).
34. This study considers the performance of the two biggest microfinance organizations in
Bangladesh other than Grameen: the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC)
and the Association for Social Advancement (ASA), as well as the Ranjpur Dinajpur Rural
Service (RDRS).
35. These repayment rates are even more impressive when contrasted with the very poor
repayment record of the government credit initiatives that pre-dated Grameen. See
Dowla (2006: 5–7).
36. There is an implicit contract across generations; using land as collateral risks losing the
land (if a bad outcome occurs), and thus violating the implicit contract.
37. Since, in the case of the de Soto model, the credit contract does not, for the most part,
come into existence, the discussion of enforcement problems is essentially hypothetical.
38. Dasgupta (2003). Similarly, in the Hoff and Stiglitz (2008) model, a sufficient number
of agents have to believe that the “rule of law” will prevail in order to support it and act
accordingly.
39. Alternatively, reliance on external enforcement can be very costly.
40. Indeed, the fact that new contract language is often interpreted in a way that is
disadvantageous to the party introducing the deviation from the standard contract
deters modifications. See Stiglitz (1992).
41. The point here is not that formal contracts allow no flexibility. Indeed, some degree of
flexibility is written into formal lending contracts. For instance you may default on an
individual credit card payment at the cost of a fine on the next payment and an adverse
effect on your credit rating, but to write the degree of flexibility into a formal lending
contract that is relatively easily achieved by an informal onewould be extremely expensive.
42. On this, see further, Dowla and Barua (2006).
43. Theoretically, at least, peer monitoring may reduce the costs of screening, but it does
not eliminate the desire of individuals not to subsidize others; that is, groups of similar
individuals—equal risk of default—will form, to eliminate or at least reduce cross-
subsidization.
44. There are other specific features of the Grameen model that may contribute to its
success, e.g., regular repayment schedules (Armendariz de Aghion andMorduch 2000).
A recent paper by Field and Pande (2008) finds, however, that a less stringent
repayment schedule does not adversely affect repayment rates. The high repayment
rates mean that the default premium built into the interest rate can be negligible for all
individuals, thus making these loans more widely accessible than under the conven-
tional market system, where, even with collateral, loans viewed as having a high default
rate bear a very high premium.
45. More generally, there is a large literature arguing the greater effectiveness of systems of
intrinsic rewards rather than extrinsic rewards. See Stiglitz (2001) and the references
cited there.
46. Some of the Grameen enterprises include Grameen Shakti (energy), Grameen Com-
munication, Grameen Trust, Grameen Fund, Grameen Shikkha (education), Grameen
Telecom, Grameen Knitwear, Grameen Cybernet, and the world’s first “social-business
enterprise,” Grameen Danone. See Yunus (2007).
47. The omnipresence of Grameen and some other leading Bangladeshi NGOs has led to
speculation about their having become para-governmental organizations. See The
Economist (2001).
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48. The cost is estimated to have dropped from around $2,000 to $50 and the time taken
from fifteen years to six weeks. See Panaritis (2001: 22).
49. Despite this function of titling having been stressed greatly in the theoretical literature
(see for instance, Demsetz 1967), it is not clear from the empirical evidence that it is
essential for investment. A number of studies show that perceived security of tenure is
more important than exact legal status. See for instance, Payne (1989), Razzaz (1993),
and Varley (1987). It is common that lenders rely more on their judgments of the
borrowers “creditworthiness,” as judged by the security of income flows, than on
collateral itself. Before the crisis, many lenders switched to more emphasis on the
value of collateral, at great cost to themselves and the economy.
50. That is, the possibility of using credit as collateral may distort investment allocations
toward the potential asset, even if the social marginal return on this investment is lower
than that to the asset.
51. He attacks the Field result on a number of counts. First, he argues that she does not
make the case that lack of title gave rise to a particular need to defend the property,
especially in a context where legitimacy can have varied bases. Second, he contends that
she fails to account for how the new jobs that titled families were purportedly absorbed
into were generated—especially in a period of economic downturn. Finally, and most
crucially, he argues that the very basis for making the comparison—the fact that the
sequence of titling was random—is false. In particular, he points out that a third of
the data for nontitled families is drawn from the Huancayo region—the birthplace
of the “Shining Path” and the epicenter of political conflict in Peru and that this data is,
consequently, not representative. See p. 309.
52. For further evidence see Haldar (2011).
53. Notice that in some such situations, land titling is simultaneously a land reform
program, i.e., giving title to property over which others might have legitimate claims.
Thus, squatters may be given secure property rights to public land that they have
occupied. This is consistent with the remark made in the introductory chapter and in
Chapter 4, that typically property rights assignments are reassignments, since claims
(however ambiguous and uncertain) still have value.
54. Landlessness is an economic problem, because of the presence of agency costs. But
when farmers have limited land, even a loss of part of their land may lead to an increase
in agency costs, as they turn to other sources of income or seek additional land to work.
55. Galliani and Schargrodsky (2005), however, do not find evidence of increased labor
income as a result of titling.
56. Joireman (2008), for instance, emphasizes the displacement of both customary law and
women’s rights as major drawbacks of the de Soto program.
57. There is evidence, for instance, of ministers in various developing countries using land
titling programs to title substantial tracts of land in the names of members of their
families rather than the intended beneficiaries. Given the disproportionate power that
the wealthy in the developing world wield over formal law, and the fact that formal law
is far more removed from social realities than informal norms, it is easier for the
wealthy to manipulate de jure rights than it is de facto ones.
58. Microfinance was originally thought to target the poorest of the poor, but it emerged
over time that conventional microfinance works best for those who are slightly better
off than those in extreme and abject poverty. In response, dedicated programs aimed at
the poorest of the poor have been introduced. Examples include Grameen’s “Beggar
Program” and BRAC’s “Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction.”
59. This refers to the collaboration between Grameen and the French yogurt company
Danone to produce low-cost high-nutrient yogurt aimed specifically at overcoming
some of the nutritional deficits of Bangladeshi children. See Yunus (2007). Grameen
has also recently entered into a collaboration with the French company Veolia to
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establish Grameen Veolia Ltd in order to supply low-cost, safe drinking water in Bangla-
deshi villages. This is particularly crucial because of the presence of arsenic in Bangladeshi
water.
60. Initiatives involving healthcare are mainly Grameen Healthcare Trust and Grameen
Kalyan. See Yunus (2007).
61. Aspersions have been cast on the motivations of Grameen for lending to women.
Mallick (2002) argues that this choice is prudential rather than ideological, since
women borrowers are easier to administer than men. This accusation is reiterated by
some Bangladeshi NGOs such as Nijera Kori. Whatever the initial impetus for lending
to women, it does not detract from the social impact of the choice.
62. Any discussion about the impact of microfinance programs is mired in the methodo-
logical controversies of the Pitt–Morduch debate. Using the same dataset, Morduch
(1998) arrived at a very different (and largely, much more negative) set of conclusions
about the impact of microfinance from Pitt and Khandker (1998). Morduch explicitly
challenged their findings, mainly on grounds that were based on a number of meth-
odological flaws (e.g., Pitt and Khandker’s calculation of land ownership by beneficiary
households, village fixed effects, and so on). Pitt (1999) responded, in turn, with
a defense of the original methodology. The exchange illustrates the difficulties that
underlie “impact assessments” of development programs in general, including large-
scale quantitative studies based on substantial datasets and rigorous econometric
analysis, and the consequent difficulty of arriving at a definitive pronouncement on
the success or failure of a program. See also Khandker (1998) and Morduch (1999).
63. Grameen Bank website: <http://www.grameen-info.org/index.php?option=com_con-
tent&task=view&id=25&Itemid=128>, accessed June 19, 2011.
64. Pitt and Khandker (1998) attempted to correct for selection bias, but Morduch (1998)
has questioned whether they were fully successful in doing so. Despite its contribution
to poverty reduction, many commentators are critical of the high interest rates that it
charges. See, for instance, Ahmad (2007: ch. 5).
65. Grameen Bank website.
66. Yunus (2007: 24).
67. Yunus (2007: 18).
68. Some studies, for instance Ebdon (1995), argue that the pressures of scaling-up and a
preoccupation with performance indicators lead to a reluctance on the part of the Bank
to make risky loans, even if this means leaving out the most disenfranchised. Grameen
II attempts to address these issues through its “Beggar Program.”
69. Even critics of the program concede some modest impact of microfinance on poverty
alleviation, for instance Morduch (1998).
70. Yunus (2007: 9).
71. Accusations have, however, been leveled against the Grameen with regard to the appro-
priation of funds by husbands or other male relatives (Goetz and Sen Gupta 1996).
Indeed, Rahman (1999) estimates that men, in effect, control as much as 60 percent of
Grameen loans. These results have failed to be validated by other studies. However, on a
relative estimate, even if that were true, women still have greater access to resources than
under the conventional system of loans being made directly to men. In fact, studies
by Van Tassel (2004) and Ligon (2002) find that, given the degree of male dominance in
Bangladesh, the involvement of the husband in the loan venturemight even be financially
prudent.
72. See also Osmani (1998).
73. Using a combination of ethnographic and survey methodology, the paper measured
women’s empowerment in terms of eight indicators: mobility, economic security,
ability to make small purchases, ability to make larger purchases, involvement in major
household decisions, relative freedom from domination within the family, political and
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legal awareness, and involvement in political campaigns and protests. See also Schuler
and Hashemi (1994).
74. Taka is the Bangladeshi currency.
75. The ILD, for instance, identifies three “crucial institutions”: fungible property rights,
legal organization reform, and identity services. In addition, it purports to provide a
“5-step” bridge to the “rule of law” and an “inclusive market economy.” See <http://ild.
org.pe/en/whatwedo>.
76. The disappointment with the first approach led the World Bank, at the end of the
1990s, to formulate its Comprehensive Development Framework. The conviction
that successful development required active engagement of those in the country was
key to both the CDF and the IMF’s Participatory Poverty Reduction Strategies. See
Wolfensohn and Fisher (2000) and Stiglitz (1998, 1999).
77. As we have emphasized, just as markets are incomplete, so are contracts and laws. It is
impossible to specify what should be done in every contingency.
78. If anything, the Grameen model is being criticized, particularly within Bangladesh, for
not adopting an even more all-encompassing approach. The Bangladeshi NGO Nijera
Kori, for instance, argues that even the “microfinance plus” model is overly simplistic
in thinking that these interventions will alter the fundamental power dynamics within
Bangladeshi villages without engaging more closely with structural issues at the
community level (see <http://www.nijerakori.org/>). This objection is further articu-
lated in Barkat (2008) and has also been made by Ahmad (2007).
79. An example of an effective alternative dispute resolution mechanism is the Lok Adalat
(people’s court) system in India.
80. Dixit (2004) stresses the importance of the role of alternative regulation mechanisms;
Sage, Adler, and Woolcock (2007) make a strong case for what they call “interim
institutions” based on their in-depth engagement and incremental transformations of
their political-economic contexts, citing successful examples of regulatory innovation
in Cambodia and Indonesia; Rodrik (2008) argues for what he calls “second-best”
institutions—which work within the constraints of deep-rooted government and
market failure that cannot be removed in the short run—emphasizing that these may
be far removed from “best-practice institutions.”
81. Very effective systems of informal regulation based on thick social networks can
sometimes be rooted in, or perpetuate, normatively undesirable values. Instances of
this include the caste system in India based on arbitrary distinctions between groups
of people or systems of customary justice that, for example, see honor killings as an
acceptable way of resolving disputes (Dixit 2009; Khadiagala 2001). More specifically,
the Grameen approach has been criticized by legal-rights activists in Bangladesh
for failing to take a more procedural, rights-based approach to lending and loan
collection.
82. This is the “microfinance plus” model referred to above. On “social businesses” see
Yunus (2007).
83. See further, <http://www.pksf-bd.org/> and <http://www.mra.gov.bd/>.
84. It is well known, of course, how important nonformal aspects of business even between
very large organizations are. See, for instance Macaulay (1963).
85. Fraudulent practices on the part of the Bangladesh microfinance organization Jubo
Karmasangsthan Society (Jubok), for instance, underscored the need for regulation.
The organization attempted to embezzle the Tk. 10 billion that it collected in deposits
from 0.15 million clients. See, on this, The Daily Star, May 25, 2006. The oversupply of
microcredit in the absence of regulation is leading to the problem of overlapping—
borrowers who take loans from one microfinance organization to repay loans to
another. Concern about this development was expressed repeatedly in personal inter-
views, see Haldar (2011). The expansion of services, e.g., toward deposit-taking, may
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also necessitate greater regulation. There are more opportunities for fraud in taking
money from people than in giving them money.
86. Grameenphone is both one of the earliest and most successful of Grameen’s social
businesses. It is a joint venture between Grameen Bank and the Norwegian telecom-
munication company Telenor. It is now the largest telecommunications service pro-
vider in Bangladesh. The reputation of the Grameen Bank is, however, a crucial factor
behind the success of the venture.
87. It was thought that as markets get stronger and communities less close-knit—or at any
rate more mobile—the settled communities on which Grameen relies may be des-
troyed. The experience of Grameen America, the new Grameen Bank branch in
Jackson Heights, New York—belies this hypothesis. Despite operating in the US and
in an urban context, repayment rates have been around 99 percent. See <http://www.
grameenamerica.com/>.
88. This is increasingly emphasized in the literature by, for instance, Aoki (2001) and Grief
(2006).
89. A classic illustration of this is, for example, the Health Act of 2006 in the UK. The
passing of this legislation in Westminster altered deep-rooted habits such as smoking,
sending smokers to the streets from inside bars, pubs, and restaurants virtually
overnight. One of the biggest advantages of effective formal law is that it is able to
influence norms, i.e., its self-conscious ability to make a positive impact on behavior
patterns.
90. On the relationship between trust and cooperation, see Arrow (1972), Coleman (1990),
and Dasgupta (2003).
91. And so too systems of sanctions for violations of norms in informal systems require
broad consensus. Almost by definition, norms are social conventions supported by
broad consensus, which may not (and often is not) the case for formal legal structures,
especially when they come from (or are supported by those from) the outside or elites.
92. As Dasgupta (2003) puts it, the generation of trust is “riddled with positive
externalities.”
93. BRAC’s Human Rights and Legal Aid Services program is, for instance, the largest legal
aid program in the world.
94. Putnam (1993: 90) contends that “taking part in a choral society or a bird-watching
club can teach self-discipline and an appreciation for the joys of successful collabor-
ation.” Hirschman (1984) describes trust as a “moral good,” growing with use and
decaying with disuse. Seabright (1997) presents empirical evidence of cooperation
begetting further cooperation. In addition, Dixit (2004: ch. 3) stresses the continuing
importance of civic associations.
95. Yunus (2007: 16).
96. Various scholars have cited other critical features, including the design of appropriate
incentive structures that are consistent with China’s specific conditions. See Qian
(2003) and Oi and Walder (1999) for alternative interpretations.
97. See Jacobs (1979).
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